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Abstract—We consider a group of m+1 trusted nodes that aim
to create a shared secret key K over a network in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. We assume a linear non-coherent
network coding broadcast channel (over a finite field Fq) from
one of the honest nodes (i.e., Alice) to the rest of them including
Eve. All of the trusted nodes can also discuss over a cost-free
public channel which is also overheard by Eve.
For this setup, we propose upper and lower bounds for the
secret key generation capacity assuming that the field size q
is very large. For the case of two trusted terminals (m = 1)
our upper and lower bounds match and we have complete
characterization for the secrecy capacity in the large field size
regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
For communication over a network performing linear net-
work coding, Cai and Yeung [1] introduced the problem of
securing a multicast transmission against an eavesdropper. In
particular, consider a network implementing linear network
coding over a finite field Fq. Let us assume that the min-
cut value from the source to each receiver is c. From the
main theorem of network coding [2], [3] we know that a
source can send information at rate equal to the min-cut c
to the destinations, in the absence of any malicious eaves-
dropper. Now, suppose there is a passive eavesdropper, Eve,
who overhears ρ arbitrary edges in the network. The secure
network coding problem is to design a coding scheme such
that Eve does not obtain any information about the messages
transmitted from the source to destinations. Cai and Yeung [1]
showed that the secrecy capacity for this problem is c−ρ and
can be achieved if the field size q is sufficiently large. Later
this problem formulation has been investigated in many other
works. Feldman et al. [4] showed that by sacrificing a small
amount of rate, one might find a secure scheme that requires
much smaller field size. Rouayheb et al. [5] observed that this
problem can be considered as a generalization of the Ozarow-
Wyner wiretap channel of type II. Silva et al. [6] proposed
a universal coding scheme that only employs encoding at the
source.
In contrast to the previous work, in this paper we study
the problem of secret key sharing among multiple terminals
when nodes can send feedback over a public channel. We
consider a source multicasting information over a network
at rate equal to the min-cut c to the destinations. We also
assume that the relay nodes in the network perform linear
randomized network coding which is modeled by a non-
coherent transmission scheme. Motivated by [7], [8], we model
a non-coherent network coding scenario by a multiplicative
matrix channel over a finite field Fq with uniform and i.i.d.
distribution over transfer matrices in every time-slot.
The problem of key agreement between a set of terminals
with access to noisy broadcast channel and public discussion
channel (visible to the eavesdropper) was studied in [9], where
some achievable secrecy rates were established, assuming Eve
does not have access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. This
was generalized in [10], [11] by developing (non-computable)
outer bounds for secrecy rates. However, to the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first work to consider multi-terminal
secret key agreement over networks employing randomized
network coding, when a passive eavesdropper has access to
the broadcast transmissions.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. For the
secret key sharing problem introduced above, we propose an
asymptotic achievability scheme assuming that the field size q
is large. This scheme is based on subspace coding and can be
extended for arbitrary number of terminals. Using the result
of [9], we derive an upper bound for this problem. For m = 1,
the proposed lower bound matches the upper bound and the
secret key generation capacity is characterized. However, for
m ≥ 2, depending on the channel parameters, the upper and
lower bound might match or not.
The paper is organized as follows. In §II we introduce
our notation and the problem formulation and present some
preliminaries. In §III, we state a general upper bound for the
key generation capacity and evaluate it for the non-coherent
network coding broadcast channel. The main results of the
paper are presented in §IV.
II. NOTATION AND SETUP
A. Notation
We use 〈X〉 to denote the row span of a matrix X . We use
also [i : j] to denote {i, i+ 1, . . . , j} where i, j ∈ Z.
Let Π be an arbitrary vector space of finite dimension
defined over a finite field Fq. Suppose Π1 and Π2 are two
subspaces of Π, i.e., Π1 ⊑ Π and Π2 ⊑ Π. We use Π1∩Π2 to
denote the common subspaces of both Π1 and Π2 and Π1+Π2
as the smallest subspace that contains both Π1 and Π2. Two
subspaces Π1 and Π2 are called orthogonal if Π1∩Π2 = {0}.
Two subspaces Π1 and Π2 of Π are called complementary if
they are orthogonal and Π1 +Π2 = Π.
Now, consider two subspaces Π1 and Π2. We define the
subtraction of Π2 from Π1 by U = Π1 \s Π2 where U is any
subspace of Π1 which is complementary with Π1 ∩Π2. Note
that, given Π1 and Π2, U is not uniquely defined.
For notational convenience, when J is a set, by ΠJ we
mean ΠJ , ∩i∈JΠi.
B. Preliminaries
Definition 1. We define S(ℓ, k) to be the set of all subspaces
of dimension at most k in the ℓ-dimensional space Fℓq.
Definition 2 (see [7]). We denote by ξ(n, d) the number of
different n × ℓ matrices with elements from a finite field Fq,
such that their rows span a specific subspace πd ⊑ Fℓq of
dimension d where 0 ≤ d ≤ min[n, ℓ]. By using [7, Lemma 2],
ξ(n, d) does not depend on ℓ and depends on πd only through
its dimension d.
Lemma 1. Suppose that k subspaces Π1, . . . ,Πk, with di-
mensions d1, . . . , dk, are chosen uniformly at random from
Fnq . Then w.h.p. (with high probability)1 we have
dim (Π1 + · · ·+Πk) = min [d1 + · · ·+ dk, n] , and
dim (Π1 ∩ · · · ∩ Πk) = [d1 + · · ·+ dk − (k − 1)n]
+
.
Note that even if one of the subspaces, for example Π1, is a
fixed subspace, then the above results are still valid.
Proof: These results follow from [12, Corollary 1] by
using induction on the number of subspaces.
C. Problem Statement
We consider a set of m+1 ≥ 2 honest nodes, T0, . . . ,Tm,
(T stands for “terminal”) that aim to share a secret key K
among themselves while keeping it concealed from a passive
adversary, Eve. Eve does not perform any transmissions, but is
trying to eavesdrop on (overhear) the communications between
the honest nodes. For convenience, sometimes we will refer to
node T0,T1,T2, . . . , as “Alice,” “Bob,” “Calvin,” and so on.
We assume that there exists a non-coherent network coding
broadcast channel (which is going to be defined more precisely
in the following) from Alice to the other terminals (including
Eve). Also we assume that the legitimate terminals can pub-
licly discuss over a noiseless rate unlimited public channel.
Consider a non-coherent linear network coding communi-
cation scenario where at every time-slot t Alice (terminal T0)
injects a set of nA vectors (packets) of length ℓ (over some
finite field Fq) into the network, denoted by the row vectors
of the matrix XA[t] ∈ FnA×ℓq . Each terminal Ti receives
ni randomly chosen linear combinations of the transmitted
vectors, namely for r ∈ {1, . . . ,m,E}, we have2
Xr[t] = Fr [t]XA[t], (1)
1During the paper by “high probability” we mean probability of order 1−
O(q−1) unless otherwise stated.
2As subscript, we use i to denote for Ti for all i ∈ [0 : m]. At some
points, we also use XA, XB, XC, etc., to denote for X0, X1, X2, etc.
where Fr[t] ∈ Fnr×nAq is chosen uniformly at random among
all possible matrices and independently for each receiver and
every time-slot. So for the channel transition probability we
can write
PX1···XmXE|XA(x1, . . . , xm, xE|xA) =
PXE|XA(xE|xA)
m∏
i=1
PXi|XA(xi|xA), (2)
where for each r ∈ {1, . . . ,m,E} we have (see [7, Sec IV-A])
PXr |XA(xr |xA) ,
{
q−nr dim(xA) if 〈xr〉 ⊑ 〈xA〉 ,
0 otherwise.
Note that in this setup we do not assume any CSI3 at the
transmitter or receivers.
In order to define the secrecy capacity, we use [13, Defini-
tion 1] and [13, Definition 2] (see also [14], [15], [9], [11]).
III. UPPER BOUND
A. Secrecy Upper Bound for Independent Broadcast Channels
The secret key generation capacity among multiple termi-
nals (without eavesdropper having access to the broadcast
channel) is completely characterized in [9]. By using this
result, it is possible to state an upper bound for the secrecy
capacity of the key generation problem among multiple termi-
nals where the eavesdropper has also access to the broadcast
channel. This can be done by adding a dummy terminal to the
first problem and giving all the eavesdropper’s information to
this dummy node and let it to participate in the key generation
protocol. By doing so, the secret key generation rate does
not decrease. Hence by combining [9, Theorem 4.1] and [9,
Lemma 5.1], the following result can be stated.
Theorem 1. The secret key generation capacity is upper
bounded as follows
Cs ≤
max
PX0
min
λ∈Λ([0:m])

H(X[0:m]|XE)− ∑
B([0:m]
λBH(XB|XBc , XE)

 ,
where Λ([0 : m]) is the set of all collections λ =
{λB : B ( [0 : m], B 6= ∅} of weights 0 ≤ λB ≤ 1, satisfying∑
B([0:m],i∈B
λB = 1, ∀i ∈ [0 : m].
Note that in the above expression for the upper bound, it is
possible to change the order of maximization and minimization
[9, Theorem 4.1].
Now, for our problem where the channel from Alice to the
other terminals are assumed to be independent, we can further
simplify the upper bound given in Theorem 1, as stated in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If the channels from Alice to the other terminals
are independent, as described in (2), then the upper bound
3Channel state information.
stated in Theorem 1, for the secret key generation capacity is
simplified to
Cs ≤ max
PX0
min
j∈[1:m]
I(X0;Xj |XE) (3)
≤ min
j∈[1:m]
max
PX0
I(X0;Xj |XE). (4)
Proof: For the proof please refer to [16].
Remark: Note that (3) is the best upper bound one might hope
for an independent broadcast channel using results of [9].
Remark: Using [14, Theorem 7] or [15, Theorem 2], we
observe that the bound given in (4) is indeed tight for the
two terminals problem where we have the Markov chains
XB ↔ XA ↔ XE (when the channels are independent) or
XA ↔ XB ↔ XE (when the channels are degraded).
B. Upper Bound for Non-coherent Channel
In the previous section, we have shown that the secret key
generation rate for our problem can be upper bounded by (4).
Now, we need to evaluate the above upper bound for the non-
coherent network coding channel defined in §II-C.
Lemma 2. For the joint distribution of the form
PXAXiXE(xA, xi, xE) = PXA(xA)PXi|XA(xi|xA)PXE|XA(xE|xA)
the mutual information I(XA;Xi|XE) is a concave function
of PXA(xA) for fixed PXi|XA(xi|xA) and PXE|XA(xE|xA).
Proof: For the proof please refer to [16].
Similar to [7, Definition 5], here we define an equivalent
subspace broadcast channel from Alice (terminal T0) to the
rest of terminals as follows. We assume that Alice sends a
subspace ΠA ∈ S(ℓ, nA) where ΠA = 〈XA〉 and each of the
legitimate terminals receives Πi ∈ S(ℓ, ni) and Eve receives
ΠE ∈ S(ℓ, nE) where Πi = 〈Xi〉 and ΠE = 〈XE〉, respectively.
The channel transition probabilities are independent and for
each receiver i is defined as follows
PΠi|ΠA(πi|πA) ,
{
ξ
(
ni, dim(πi)
)
q−ni dim(πA) if πi ⊑ πA,
0 otherwise,
where the function ξ is defined in Definition 2.
Lemma 3. For every input distribution PXA there exists an in-
put distribution PΠA such that I(XA;Xi|XE) = I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE)
and vice-versa.
Proof: For the proof please refer to [16].
So by Lemma 3, in order to maximize I(XA;Xi|XE) with
respect to PXA it is sufficient to solve an equivalent problem,
i.e., maximize I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) with respect to PΠA ; which is
seemingly a simpler optimization problem.
Lemma 4. The input distribution that maximizes
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) is the one which is uniform over all subspaces
having the same dimension.
Proof: By the concavity of I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) with respect
to PΠA , that is stated in Lemma 2, the proof follows by an
argument very similar to [7, Lemma 8].
Lemma 5. Asymptotically in the field size, we have
max
PX
A
I(XA;Xi|XE) = max
PΠ
A
I(ΠA; Πi|ΠE) =
(min[nA, ni + nE]− nE) (ℓ−min[nA, ni + nE]) log q.
Proof: For the proof refer to [16].
Thus, by using the upper bound given in (4) and Lemma 5
we have the following result for the upper bound on the secret
key generation rate, as stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. The secret key generation rate in a non-coherent
network coding scenario, which is defined in §II-C, is asymp-
totically (in the field size) upper bounded by
Cs ≤
min
i∈[1:m]
[
(min[nA, ni + nE]− nE) (ℓ−min[nA, ni + nE])
]
log q.
Remark: Note that if nE = nA then the secret key generation
rate is zero because Eve is so powerful that she overhears all
of the transmitted information.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ACHIEVABILITY SCHEME
Here in this section, we describe our achievability scheme
for the secret key sharing problem among multiple terminals
in a non-coherent network coding setup.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that4 nA < ℓ.
Moreover, in this work we focus on the asymptotic regime
where the field size is large. Suppose that Alice broadcasts a
message XA[t] at time-slot t of the following form
XA[t] =
[
InA×nA M [t]
]
, (5)
where M [t] ∈ FnA×(ℓ−nA)q is a uniformly at random distributed
matrix. The rest of legitimate terminals and Eve receive a
linear transformed version of XA[t] according to the channel
introduced in (1).
For each terminal r ∈ {A, 1, . . . ,m,E}, we define the
subspace Πr , 〈Xr〉. Then, for every r 6= A we have
Πr ⊑ ΠA. Because of (5), after broadcasting XA[t], the
legitimate terminals learn the channel state and reveal the
channel transfer matrices Fr[t], r ∈ [1 : m], publicly over
the public channel. Thus Alice can also recover the subspaces
Πr for all of the legitimate terminals.
Now, for each non-empty subset J ⊆ [1 : m] of legitimate
receivers, let us define the subspace UJ as follows
UJ , ΠJ \s
(∑
i∈J c
ΠiJ +ΠEJ
)
, (6)
where ΠJ = ∩i∈JΠi, ΠiJ = Πi ∩ ΠJ , and ΠEJ = ΠE ∩
ΠJ . By definition, UJ is the common subspace among the
receivers in J which is orthogonal to all of the subspaces of
other terminals, i.e., it is orthogonal to Πi, i ∈ J c, and ΠE (see
also Fig. 1). Note that the subspaces UJ ’s are not uniquely
defined. However, from the definition of the operator “\s”, it
4If nA ≥ ℓ then Alice can reduce the number of injected packets into the
network from nA to some smaller number n′A where n′A < ℓ.
can be easily shown that the dimension of each UJ is uniquely
determined and equal to
dim(UJ ) = dim(ΠJ )− dim
(∑
i∈J c
ΠiJ +ΠEJ
)
. (7)
If Alice had the subspace ΠE observed by Eve, she would
be able to construct subspaces UJ ’s; but she does not have ΠE.
However, because the subspaces Πi’s and ΠE are chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random from ΠA, and because the
field size q is large, Alice, by applying Lemma 1, can find the
dimension of each UJ w.h.p. Then it can be easily observed
that (e.g., see [12, Lemma 3]) if Alice chooses a uniformly
at random subspace of ΠJ with dimension dim(UJ ) then it
satisfies (6) w.h.p., so it can be a possible candidate for UJ .
Now, consider 2m−1 different non-empty subsets of [1 : m].
To each subset ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], we assign a parameter
θJ ≥ 0 such that the following set of inequalities hold,
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤ dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk +ΠE)− dim(ΠE), (8)
for any k ∈ [1 : 2(2m−1) − 1] and any different selection
of subsets J1, . . . ,Jk. Note that the right hand side of the
inequalities defined in (8) depend on the actual choice of
subspaces UJ ’s. But, as described above, in the following we
assume that UJ ’s are chosen uniformly at random from ΠJ .
If Alice knows the subspace ΠE, then we can state the
following result.
Lemma 6. There exists subspaces U ′J ⊑ UJ such that
dim(U ′J ) = θJ for all ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], and U ′J ’s and
ΠE are orthogonal subspaces (i.e., dim(ΠE +
∑
i U
′
Ji
) =
dim(ΠE) +
∑
i θJi ) if and only if θJ ’s are non-negative
integers and satisfy (8).
Proof: The proof of this lemma is based on [17,
Lemma 4] and can be found in [16].
Fig.1 depicts pictorially the relation between subspaces
introduced in the above discussions.
Fig. 1. The relations between subspaces Π’s, U ’s, and U ′’s for the case of
m = 2.
Although in practice Alice only knows the dimension of ΠE
(w.h.p.), but still she can find subspaces U ′J ⊑ UJ such that
the result of Lemma 6 holds w.h.p., as stated in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Alice can find subspaces U ′J ⊑ UJ such that
dim(U ′J ) = θJ for all ∅ 6= J ⊆ [1 : m], and U ′J ’s
are orthogonal subspaces and U ′J ’s and ΠE are orthogonal
subspaces w.h.p., if and only if θJ ’s are non-negative integers
and satisfy (8).
Proof: For the proof refer to [16].
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. The secret key sharing rate given by the solution
of the following convex optimization problem can be asymp-
totically (in the field size) achieved
maximize
[
minr∈[1:m]
∑
J∋r θJ
]
(ℓ− nA) log q
subject to θJ ≥ 0, ∀J ⊆ [1 : m], J 6= ∅, and
θJ1 + · · ·+ θJk ≤
dim (UJ1 + · · ·+ UJk +ΠE)− dim(ΠE)
∀k, ∀J1, . . . ,Jk : ∅ 6= Ji ⊆ [1 : m],
Ji 6= Jj if i 6= j,
where for every J , UJ is chosen uniformly at random from
ΠJ with the dimension calculated by (7) under the assumption
that Π1, . . . ,Πm, and ΠE are selected independently and
uniformly at random from ΠA with dimensions n1, . . . , nm, nE.
Proof of Theorem 3: Let Alice use the broadcast channel
N times by sending matrices XA[1], . . . , XA[N ] of the form
(5). As mentioned before, in every time-slot t, each of the
legitimate terminals sends publicly the channel transfer matrix
it has received.
Then, let us define θˆJ , ⌊NθJ ⌋ for all J and consider the
following set of inequalities
θˆJ1 + · · ·+ θˆJk +N dim(ΠE) ≤
dim
(
N⊕
t=1
UJ1 [t] + · · ·+
N⊕
t=1
UJk [t] +
N⊕
t=1
ΠE[t]
)
, (9)
where “⊕” is the direct sum operator. Each of UˆJi ,⊕N
t=1 UJi [t] is a subspace of an N × nA dimensional space⊕N
t=1ΠA[t]. Similarly, we have ΠˆE ⊑
⊕N
t=1ΠA[t] where
ΠˆE ,
⊕N
t=1ΠE[t]. It can be easily seen that if the set of
inequalities (8) are satisfied then the set of inequalities (9) are
also satisfied.
Now, by using Lemma 7, Alice can find a set of orthogonal
subspaces Uˆ ′J with dimension θˆJ (that are also orthogonal
to ΠˆE w.h.p.). By applying Lemma 8 (appeared after this
theorem), one would observe that if Alice uses a basis of Uˆ ′J
(θˆJ linear independent vectors from Uˆ ′J ) to share a secret
key KJ with all terminals in J , then this key is secure from
Eve and all other legitimate terminals in J c w.h.p.Using each
key KJ , Alice can send a message of size θˆJ (ℓ − nA) log q
secretly to the terminals in J . In order to share the key KJ ,
Alice sends publicly a set of coefficients for each terminal
in J so that each of them can construct the subspace UˆJ
from their own received subspace. Note that even having these
coefficients, Eve cannot recover any information regardingKJ
(for more discussion see [13]).
Up until now, the problem of sharing a key K among
legitimate terminals have been reduced to a multicast problem
where Alice would like to transmit a message (i.e., the shared
key K) to a set of terminal where the rth one has a min-cut
∑
J∋r θˆJ . From the main theorem of network coding (e.g., see
[2], [3], [18], [19]), we know that this problem can be solved
by performing linear network coding where the achievable rate
is as follows
Rs ≤
[
1
N
min
r∈[1:m]
∑
J∋r
θˆJ
]
(ℓ− nA) log q.
By increasing N , the achievable secrecy rate will be arbitrarily
close to Rs ≤
[
minr∈[1:m]
∑
J∋r θJ
]
(ℓ − nA) log q, and we
are done.
Lemma 8. Consider a set of nA packets denoted by the rows
of a matrix XA ∈ FnA×ℓq of the form XA = [I M ], where
M ∼ Uni
(
F
nA×(ℓ−nA)
q
)
. Assume that Eve has overheard nE
independent linear combinations of these packets, represented
by the rows of a matrix XE ∈ FnE×ℓq . Then for every k packets
y1, . . . , yk that are linear combinations of the rows of XA, if
the subspace ΠY = 〈y1, . . . , yk〉 is orthogonal to 〈XE〉 we
have I(y1, . . . , yk;XE) = 0.
Proof: The proof is stated in [16, Appendix B].
A. Special Case: Achievability Scheme for Two Terminals
For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume
that nB ≤ nA and nE ≤ nA. The key generation scheme starts
by Alice broadcasting a message XA[t] at time t of the form
of (5). Then, Theorem 3 states that the secrecy rate Rs is
achievable if
Rs ≤ [dim(UB +ΠE)− dim(ΠE)] (ℓ− nA) log q,
where UB = ΠB \s ΠE (for convenience we have replaced
U{B} with UB). Because UB ∩ ΠE = {0}, we have
Rs ≤ [dim(UB)] (ℓ− nA) log q
= [dim(ΠB)− dim(ΠB ∩ ΠE)] (ℓ − nA) log q
=
[
nB − (nB + nE − nA)
+
]
(ℓ− nA) log q
= [min[nA, nB + nE]− nE] (ℓ− nA) log q,
where this is the same as the upper bound given in Theorem 2.
This is obvious when nA ≤ nB + nE. On the other hand, if
nA > nB + nE, then Alice can reduce the number of injected
packets in every time-slot from nA to nB + nE (there is no
need to use more than nB + nE degrees of freedom).
Remark: Note that in the above scheme, as long as nE < nA,
the secrecy rate is non-zero.
Now, we compare the derived secrecy rate with the case
where no feedback is allowed. First let us assume that nB ≥
nE. Then, in the non-coherent network coding scenario intro-
duced in §II-C, it can be easily verified that the channel from
Alice to Eve is a stochastically degraded (for the definition
refer to [20, p. 373]) version of the channel from Alice to Bob.
So by applying the result of [21] or [22, Theorem 3], for
the secret key sharing capacity we can write
Cs = max
PX
A
[I(XA;XB)− I(XA;XE)]
=max
PΠ
A
[I(ΠA; ΠB)− I(ΠA; ΠE)] ,
where the sufficiency of optimization over subspaces follows
from a similar argument to [7, Theorem 1]. Similar to the
proof of Lemma 5, one can show that
Cs = [nB − nE]
+(ℓ− nB) log q,
which is positive only if nB > nE. 
The above comparison demonstrates the amount of improve-
ment of the secret key generation rate we might gain by using
feedback.
B. Special Case: Achievability Scheme for Three Terminals
As an another example, here we consider the three trusted
terminals problem (i.e., m = 2). As before, we assume that
nA < ℓ and for the convenience we suppose that nB = nC ≤
nA and nE ≤ nA.
In order to characterize the achievable secrecy rate, we need
to find the dimension of subspaces UB, UC, and UBC and their
sums (including ΠE as well). We assume that the field size
q is large and we know that ΠB, ΠC, and ΠE are chosen
uniformly at random from ΠA. Subspaces ΠBC and ΠBE are
also distributed independently and uniformly at random in ΠB.
Similarly, the same is true for ΠBC and ΠCE in ΠC. We have

UB , ΠB \s (ΠBC +ΠBE)
UC , ΠC \s (ΠBC +ΠCE)
UBC , ΠBC \s (ΠBCE),
so we can write
dim(UB) = dim(ΠB)− dim(ΠBC +ΠBE)
(a)
= dim(ΠB)−min [dim(ΠBC) + dim(ΠBE),dim(ΠB)]
(b)
= nB −min [dim(ΠBC) + dim(ΠBE), nB]
= [nB − dim(ΠBC)− dim(ΠBE)]
+
(c)
=
[
nB − (2nB − nA)
+ − (nB + nE − nA)
+]+ ,
where (a) follows from Lemma 1 because ΠBC and ΠBE are
chosen independently and uniformly at random from ΠB, (b)
is true because q is large, and (c) follows from Lemma 1.
Note that because we have assumed nB = nC it follows that
dim(UC) = dim(UB).
Similarly, for the dimension of UBC we can write
dim(UBC) = dim(ΠBC)− dim(ΠBCE)
= dim(ΠBC)− [dim(ΠBC) + nE − nA]
+
= min
[
nA − nE, (2nB − nA)
+
]
.
Proposition 1. From the construction, the subspaces UB, UC,
and UBC are orthogonal and similarly the same holds for UB,
UBC, and ΠE. Also UC, UBC, and ΠE are orthogonal w.h.p.
Now we may write the linear program stated in Theorem 3
as follows
maximize min [θB + θBC, θC + θBC] (ℓ− nA) log q
subject to θB ≤ dim(UB +ΠE)− nE
θC ≤ dim(UC +ΠE)− nE
θBC ≤ dim(UBC +ΠE)− nE
θB + θC ≤ dim(UB + UC +ΠE)− nE
θB + θC + θBC ≤ dim(UB + UC + UBC +ΠE)− nE.
Because of the symmetry in the problem (nB = nC), for the
optimal solution we should have θB = θC. Knowing this and
using Proposition 1, we may further simplify the above linear
program as follows
maximize [θB + θBC] (ℓ− nA) log q
subject to θB ≤
1
2
[dim(UB + UC +ΠE)− nE] , α1
θBC ≤ dim(UBC) , α2
2θB + θBC ≤ dim(UB + UC + UBC +ΠE)− nE , α3.
From the definitions of α’s, we can easily observe that, α3 ≥
2α1, α3 ≥ α2, and α3 ≤ 2α1 + α2. Hence, θB + θBC gets its
maximum at the point (θB, θBC) = (α3−α22 , α2). Thus, for the
maximum achievable secrecy rate we have
Rs =
[
α2 + α3
2
]
(ℓ− nA) log q.
As mentioned before, we assume that subspaces UJ ’s are
chosen uniformly at random from ΠJ . So ΠE and UJ ’s are
independent and for α3 we can write
α3 = min[dim(UB) + dim(UC) + dim(UBC) + dim(ΠE), nA]− nE
= min[dim(UB) + dim(UC) + dim(UBC), nA − nE]
= min[2 dim(UB) + dim(UBC), nA − nE].
So for the secrecy rate (achievable asymptotically when q goes
to infinity) we have
Rs/(ℓ− nA) log q =
min
[
dim(UB) + dim(UBC),
1
2
(nA + dim(UBC)− nE)
]
. (10)
Example 1. As an example, here we compare the achievable
secret key sharing rate among three legitimate terminals (i.e.,
m = 2) as derived in (10) with the upper bound stated in
Theorem 2. We consider two symmetric setup where for the
first one we have nA = 60, nB = nC = 15 (see Fig. 2(a))
and for the second one we have nA = 60, nB = nC = 45 (see
Fig. 2(b)). In each of these situations, we depict the upper and
lower bounds on the secret key generation rate as a function
of the number of packets (degrees of freedom) received by Eve.
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